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During the night of 13–14 November, the city of Paris
was exposed, within a few hours, to three bomb
explosions, four shooting scenes, and one 3-hour
hostage-taking of several hundred people causing at
least 130 deaths and more than 250 injured victims.
Most unstable patients were transferred to the six
trauma centers of the Paris area, all members of the
TRAUMABASE Group. A rapid adaptation of the
organization of trauma patients’ admittance was
required in all centers to face the particular needs of
the situation. Everything went relatively well in all
centers, with overall hospital mortality below 2 %.
Nevertheless, most physicians nowadays agree that
anticipation, teaching, and training are crucial to
appropriately face such events. All of us have learned
many additional issues from this experience. Following
a meeting of the TRAUMABASE Group, the most
relevant issues are detailed in the following.patients among resources according to both information
provided by the teams and monitoring of the global con-Organization
The initial team was quite easily identified from human
resources already present within the hospital. They had
to be quickly split into two groups: those finishing the
ongoing routine procedures, and those organizing the
forthcoming tasks. A single director of medical opera-
tions (DMO), with recognized authority, was quickly
identified in each department. Their first mission was to
recall medical resources, taking simultaneous care of the
anticipated evolution and the unavoidable needs of
teams for the day after. All centers have noticed an
important feeling of frustration in people asked to stay
at home to rest. This must be considered in parallel with
the massive mobilization of everyone to help in one way
or another. The recall of nonmedical resources was* Correspondence: mathieu.raux@aphp.fr
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pital administrations as anticipated by the “Plan blanc”
which is dedicated to this purpose. The attack occurring
at night was fortunate. It is easier to mobilize unused
resources than to manage the rapid ending of numerous
surgical procedures, which would have been required
during the day.
Most of us encountered difficulties with patients’
identities. Severe patients were anonymous, without
any identity documentation left at the shooting scene.
Effective systems exist outside and within the hospital
but do not communicate. The required time to check
the coherence between different naming systems was not
available. This highlighted the importance of being
simultaneously able to integrate an unambiguous identity
established outside and able to generate a temporary
identity devoid of ambiguity. A person dedicated to this
mission is probably required.
The DMOs following tasks were mainly to dedicate
appropriate teams for each patient and then to distribute
text. Consultation with surgical teams was of varying
quality depending on the center. In the military hospital,
a couple of senior intensivists/surgeons planned for im-
mediate in-hospital triage. In several civilian hospitals,
regulatory principles of the massive influx of patients
had to be explained at this point among doctors, stres-
sing the importance of good preparation. All centers
have planned or achieved a multidisciplinary debriefing
meeting. Out-of-hospital information tracking was cru-
cial and has been difficult for all DMOs. Resources in-
cluding spare operating rooms were necessary in case of
an expected new wave of patients but many patients
already present had to be operated on relatively urgently.
This highlights the importance of a communication
channel between the police authorities, out-of-hospital
emergency services, and DMOs. In the absence of soft-
ware devoted to this function, placard papers or erasable
boards were essential tools. They allowed monitoring by
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lesions, with nearly all presenting almost identical lesions.
Stabilized patients were redirected to the intensive care
unit or to another area, offloading the reception area.
Medical aspects
Damage control, which is routinely used in trauma
patients, aims to treat within <45 minutes any life-
threatening lesions delaying the treatment of secondary,
nonvital, wounds [1]. In case of resource weakness, dam-
age control offers an additional benefit by quickly redis-
tributing resources to other patients. In other words,
when a great wave of patient admittance is anticipated,
stabilized patients having to be treated must wait mainly
to avoid resource limitation. At 1:00 a.m. on 14 November,
30 minutes following the onset of the police assault of the
Bataclan concert hall, the treatment of nonvital surgical
lesions had to be delayed but the overall time finally
available for surgery allowed avoiding restrictions in in-
dications or limitations of the quality of surgical proce-
dures. Medical procedures and computed tomography
(CT) scans were limited everywhere to those which
were absolutely and immediately necessary. Most CT
scans were done after the event. Catheterizing was de-
layed until the operating room. When needed, vasocon-
strictors were administered on peripheral routes. CT
scans were performed only in patients whose support
depended on them.
Conclusion
As expected, the TRAUMABASE Group’s conclusion is
that daily trauma training associated with specific massive
patient influx teaching would further enhance the support
that we have experienced as satisfactory.
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